



A MERICAN FOREIGN policy
identifies the ongoing spread of
democracy around the world as a vital
national interest, seeing other democratic
states as "effective partners joining with
us to promote global freedom and pros-
perity," in the words of the 2006 Na-
tional Security Strategy. But events in the
last few months of 2007-in countries as
different as Pakistan, Kenya and Geor-
gia-demonstrated that the challenges in
spreading democracy are different than
the ones the United States confronted
more than a decade ago. It is no longer
a clear-cut struggle between anti-West-
ern dictators and pro-American masses
struggling to be free, nor one of helping
right-minded postauthoritarian leaders
move their countries toward democracy.
Instead, the challenge is now how to "de-
velop better strategies for advancing de-
mocracy in semi-authoritarian countries,
when the leaders do not want further
democratization"-especially when those
leaders may also be pro-American in their
strategic orientation.1 Trying to craft pol-
icy responses to troubling events-the
street demonstrations and varying de-
grees of violence ranging from tear gas
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and rubber bullets in Georgia to political
assassination and suicide bombs in Paki-
stan and widespread civilian casualties in
Kenya-demonstrate how difficult these
tasks can be.
In Pakistan, the United States had
supported a clearly undemocratic leader in
hopes that Pakistan would remain, or be-
come, a valuable ally in the war on terror.
As Pervez Musharraf became increasingly
undemocratic and unpopular, this posi-
tion became more difficult for the United
States. The Pakistani parliamentary elec-
tions in February 2008 demonstrated the
extent to which the Pakistani people had
become tired of their leader as Musharraf's
party lost badly, further demonstrating the
need for the United States to rethink its
policy toward that key country.
Developments in Kenya and Geor-
gia were especially troubling because the
United States had invested high hopes
that the success of democracy in these
two countries would spread beyond their
immediate borders and lead to further
democratic breakthroughs across Africa
and the post-Soviet space, respectively.
But the 2007 Kenyan presidential elec-
tion ended in charges from opposition-
candidate Raila Odinga that Kenyan
President Mwai Kibaki-who himself had
come to power in an election assessed
as reasonably free and fair in 2002 when
he had run as the leader of an opposi-
tion coalition-had stolen the election.
These accusations spilled into the streets
and villages of Kenya, leading to wide-
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spread civil unrest, and by conservative
estimates, hundreds of civilian casualties.
These events occurred in a country that
many had viewed as one of the hopes for
democracy in Africa. Efforts to broker
a compromise between the two groups
seem to be getting some traction, but the
deeper issues there certainly remain.
In Georgia, a government which had
come to power through a peaceful elector-
al breakthrough and had pledged its com-
mitment to democracy and integration
into Western political institutions relied
on tear gas, rubber bullets, accusing oppo-
sition leaders of being Russian pawns and
using emergency law to break up peace-
ful demonstrations. The story in Georgia
became further complicated by snap presi-
dential elections in which President Saa-
kashvili was reelected with 53.4 percent of
the vote, although this was down from the
96 percent he received in 2004.
All three of these countries highlight
related problems in America's strategy
of promoting democracy in countries of
strategic import. Sometimes, democratic
institutions do not show themselves to
be as strong as they look at first from the
outside-and individuals in whom the
West places confidence do not always live
up to their promises. Moreover, in each
of these three countries, the cultivation
of democracy must occur alongside the
challenge of building an effective state.
The problems of pursuing these two
goals simultaneously should not be over-
looked. Democracies that cannot con-
struct effective state institutions-includ-
ing those charged with guaranteeing law
and order-and deliver essential services
will not last. But this creates the very real
temptation to focus on state building at
the expense of further democratization,
and to argue that strengthening the gov-
ernment, even at the expense of partici-
pation and accountability, is justifiable.
Finally, democracy itself needs to be
balanced against other American inter-
ests-such as cooperation in the war on
terror in Pakistan and Kenya or facilitat-
ing the West's energy security in Georgia.
However, the recent events in the above
three examples have demonstrated that
de-emphasizing democratic development
comes with a cost-even for America's
core security interests.
O F THESE three countries,
Georgia is perhaps the most in-
triguing, because it shows just how dif-
ficult it is, even under reasonably good
circumstances, to consolidate democratic
gains-as well as how strong the temp-
tation to cut democratic corners in the
name of expedience and state building
is, even for those who claim, with some
legitimacy, to be democrats.
The November 2007 images looked
uncannily like those of the Rose Revo-
lution of November 2003: thousands of
demonstrators shivering on the wintry
streets of Tbilisi, listening to firebrand
speeches by angry radical leaders, being
encouraged by an assertive and indepen-
dent television station while the govern-
ment seemed flummoxed and made vague
allusions to shadowy Russian plots. But
there was one major difference between
these two Novembers. In November 2003,
the demonstrators were protesting a failed,
kleptocratic leader who had presided over
more than a decade of corruption, eco-
nomic decline and even the partial break-
up of the Georgian state. In November
2007, the demonstrations were against a
democratically elected leader who had re-
duced corruption, improved the country's
economy and begun to put the Georgian
state back together. The new Georgian
state was stronger and less corrupt than in
the past, but in key respects, less free and
more dominated by one political group.
In truth, democracy has been stalled
in Georgia for a few years. Georgia's im-
pressive record of political reform, fight-
ing corruption, reasserting sovereignty
over the breakaway region of Ajara and
Upper Abkhazia, or the Kodori Gorge,
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improving the investment climate, reduc-
ing unnecessary bureaucracy and improv-
ing the energy situation should be recog-
nized. However, the government's record
on democracy issues which have direct
bearing on the extent to which opposition
voices are heard-the degree to which
policy is debated and input is sought, how
the government is kept in check, trans-
parency and the like-is far less impres-
sive. Georgia's democratic development
since the Rose Revolution has been char-
acterized by strong rhetoric and verbal
commitments to democracy from both
the U.S. and Georgian governments, but
both governments have fallen short in
their efforts to follow through on this.
Beginning with the constitutional
reforms the new administration pushed
through in the early part of 2004 that
substantially weakened the parliament
and concentrated more power in the pres-
idency, a troubling lack of commitment to
democracy on the part of the government
began to emerge. This became clearer a
few months later when previously live-
ly and often-critical political talk shows
were taken off the air and replaced by
drier, less-controversial fare. The line
between the new governing party and
the Georgian state remained blurred as
Saakashvili's National Movement con-
solidated its control over the government
after handily winning the parliamentary
elections in March of 2004. An inde-
pendent judiciary never fully emerged as
important court cases were said to be de-
cided by the judiciary only after consulta-
tion with the executive.
Then there were the 2006 elections.
Though they were determined to be
democratic, their fairness was question-
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able. First the dates and structure of local
elections were manipulated to maximize
the ruling party's representation. Then,
later that year, a constitutional amend-
ment was passed linking the date of the
presidential election with the parliamen-
tary election. Presumably, such a change
was intended to give a boost to unpopular
candidates from the government's party
by allowing them to ride the coattails of a
popular president.
Finally, since the Rose Revolution,
Georgia has not had an impartial broad-
cast media. Both Rustavi 2 and Imedi,
two major Georgian television stations,
became highly partisan, one clearly sup-
porting the government and the other
clearly sympathizing with the opposition.
This is the environment which produced
the demonstrations and the reaction by
the government in November 2007. The
story became even more confusing when
the president resigned on November 26
and called for a snap presidential elec-
tion on January 5. The ensuing campaign
period was marked by unequal access to
media and state resources, altogether al-
lowing for a free, but not necessarily fair,
election.
Throughout these years, Saakashvili's
rhetoric about wanting to make Geor-
gia a strong and democratic country was
taken at face value by the United States.
If criticisms were made, they were ex-
pressed privately-as the official position
of the United States was that democracy
was sailing along in Georgia. U.S. fund-
ing priorities reflected this as support
for Georgian civil society and political-
party development gave way to programs
aimed at strengthening and supporting
the Georgian government. This silence
on the part of the United States was
interpreted, probably correctly, by the
Georgian government as evidence that
the U.S. government shared the opinion
that making further progress on democ-
racy did not need to be a high priority for
the Georgian government.
T HE BUSH administration hashailed post-Rose Revolution
Georgia as one of its "success stories" in
the freedom crusade-and as proof that
the United States could "do both"-se-
cure its interests while spreading democ-
racy. And after Saakashvili was reelected
on January 5, many viewed the relatively
good election as evidence that democracy
was back on track in Georgia. The warm
feelings which characterized the March
2008 meeting between Bush and Saakash-
vili underscore this sentiment.
But are elections enough? President
Saakashvili's remark that "this competi-
tive election has once again shown that
Georgia is a 'beacon of democracy' in
the region" notwithstanding, reasonably
good elections in January of 2008 were
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for strengthening democracy in Georgia.
This, of course, is true in all democratiz-
ing countries, not just Georgia. However,
when the West focuses so much attention
on elections as a measure of democratic
achievement in Georgia, or any other
country, it creates an easy target for those
who criticize democracy work as being
too election centered. A more compa-
rable case for Georgia might be Ukraine
where a Western-oriented coalition nar-
rowly won last fall's parliamentary elec-
tion. In Ukraine, as in Georgia, the work
of building democracy has more to do
with institutions and civil society than
with elections.
The broader problem with the strat-
egy of settling for semidemocracies or
polities that are "democratic enough" is
that semidemocratic countries rarely de-
liver the stability they promise; and sud-
den changes in government can quick-
ly change the relationship between the
United States and a key ally. This is what
we are now seeing in Pakistan and could
potentially see in other parts of the post-
Soviet world, most notably in central Asia.
So where did the policy go wrong in
Georgia and how can this experience in-
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form U.S. democracy policy more glob-
ally? First, we fell into the convenient
trap of supporting individuals rather than
institutions. Saakashvili's intellect, humor,
passion, courage and English-language
skills were particularly appealing in the
United States where they were reinforced
by a familiarity with the United States
and its culture. The policy of the United
States was that the government and spe-
cifically the president of Georgia were
the democrats, so what they did had to be
in the interest of democracy in Georgia.
But tying the hopes of democracy to an
individual is not a very effective strategy
for assisting a budding democracy, not
to mention antithetical to basic notions
of democracy. Democracy rarely evolves
simply because a democrat gets elected,
yet U.S. policy too often reflects this be-
lief. Yet this approach remained in place
long after the Georgian government had
begun to cut corners on democracy.
We also failed to reinvigorate Geor-
gian civil society. In a poor country like
Georgia, international support plays an
essential role in civil society because there
is simply not enough money domestically
to support these types of organizations.
Shevardnadze's Georgia saw the develop-
ment of a strong and vibrant civil society,
but that was due in part to American sup-
port for civil-society organizations.
Since the Rose Revolution, civil so-
ciety has been much weaker. This is par-
tially because a number of civil-society
leaders have moved into the gov-
ernment or parliament, and par-
tially because there are more jobs
in the private sector than before,
but it is largely due to the United
States reorienting its democracy-
assistance support. By reducing
support to civil-society organiza-
tions-essentially because of the
mistaken belief that democracy
had been achieved with the Rose
Revolution and that the remain-
ing task in Georgia was largely
one of state building-the Unit-
ed States has contributed to the
withering of a key component of
democracy.
If the U.S. government does
nothing else in Georgia, they
should substantially increase
support for civil society there.
A special fund should be creat-
ed-either separately or within
USAID-focusing on support for
a broad range of advocacy, re-
search, associational and constituency-
oriented NGOs in Georgia. Though or-
ganizations critical of friendly or demo-
cratically oriented governments would
inevitably also receive funding, such sup-
port is essential for creating pluralism
and debate-two essential ingredients for
consolidating democracy.
It also proved difficult for many in
Washington, especially Georgia's numer-
ous friends, to distinguish between "re-
form" and "democratization." Saakash-
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vili's government succeeded in passing
a broad array of reform legislation that
reduced bureaucratic hurdles for those
seeking to open a business, improved
Georgia's business climate, made rational
and necessary budget decisions, improved
state apparatus, invested in the country's
infrastructure and generally improved
the quality of governance in Georgia.
However, the way in which many of these
reforms have occurred-with limited dia-
logue, parliamentary debate and public
input-has contributed to the growing
resentment of the government on the
part of the Georgian people.
In any country, we must be aware that
reforming government and liberalizing the
economy are not the same as strengthen-
ing democracy. We might add, this is espe-
cially true when one considers the reform-
oriented states of the Greater Middle East,
especially the Gulf emirates. Strengthen-
ing democracy means increasing partici-
pation and accountability in all phases of
governance and allowing for contestation
at the legislative and policymaking levels.
It does not simply mean passing reform
legislation that is Westward looking and
improving the business climate.
Finally, we found it easy to ignore two
basic rules of politics-"don't overprom-
ise" and "don't get spun." Saakashvili's
weakness for overblown rhetoric caused
him to overstate his accomplishments
and consistently make unrealistic prom-
ises. The gap between the expectations
to which this rhetoric contributed and
the reality of life in Saakashvili's Georgia
for ordinary people was a major factor
contributing to the size and vehemence
of the demonstrations in early Novem-
ber. Similarly, the rhetoric and policies
of the United States overstated the de-
gree of the changes in Georgia as well. In
some sense we also overpromised to our-
selves, causing us to overlook the flaws in
Georgian democracy and to move away
from policies aimed at ameliorating those
flaws. Verbal commitments to democracy,
no matter how eloquent and how good
the English, on the part of the govern-
ment should not have obscured problems
with democracy-Washington could have
been more rigorous in evaluating the de-
velopment of Georgia's democracy.
Of course, difficulties in post-color-
revolution consolidations of democracy
point squarely at the problems caused by
high expectations (especially if member-
ship in lucrative international organiza-
tions, such as NATO or the EU, seemed to
be just on the horizon). In Ukraine and in
Georgia, the lack of any strategy designed
to tap down short-term expectations-as
well as the inability to give democratic
leaders enough meaningful and immedi-
ate rewards that would resonate with their
electorates-created serious obstacles to
democratic consolidation.
F OR THE United States, it is time
to make some decisions regarding
the importance we accord to promoting
democracy. Georgia will be an important
case of America's resolve.
It is important to note here that a U.S.
policy of supporting a stronger Georgian
state at the expense of democracy is not in
of itself a mistake. It is reasonable for U.S.
foreign policy to reflect the notion that
we are best served by a government in
Georgia that is pro-Western, market ori-
ented, supportive of U.S. foreign policy,
reasonably popular domestically, but with
only a lukewarm commitment to democ-
racy. However, it creates problems when
we claim that this government is fully
democratic or even fully committed to
democracy. As this assertion is increasing-
ly contradicted by the reality in Georgia,
it reflects poorly on U.S. foreign policy
and the sincerity of our commitment to
democracy. More importantly it plays into
the hands of those who oppose the United
States, and in some cases Georgia as well.
Even though the states of democracy in
the three countries are not comparable,
our failure to criticize Georgia's semide-
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mocracy has made our condemnation of
far more repressive systems in the region
such as Russia and Kazakhstan sound hol-
low at times.
So U.S. policy makers must decide
whether or not democracy is worth pur-
suing in Georgia. If the answer is no,
then we should quickly move away from
rhetoric which emphasizes the ascendan-
cy of democracy in Georgia and begin
treating that country accordingly. If de-
mocracy should continue to play a key
role in U.S. policy toward Georgia-and
I believe it should because in Georgia
democracy is the key to stability and be-
cause of Georgia's import with regard to
democracy globally-the United States
needs to sharpen its democracy policy to-
ward Georgia as outlined above.
The policy decisions the United
States makes with regard to Georgia will
have relevance far beyond the borders of
that faraway, resource-poor country. The
need to balance democracy with other
policy goals, the question of what kind
of democracies we seek to support in the
developing world and how willing we are
to criticize democratic shortcomings in
friendly countries are global.
Another way to phrase this question
is to ask where democracy assistance fits
into U.S. foreign policy more broadly.
The current reality is that it is an impor-
tant but not paramount component of
our foreign policy and that its centrality
varies from country to country. Georgia
forces us to put this abstract notion into a
more-concrete framework.
If our policy in Georgia is that it
is "democratic enough" for the United
States, it is hard to imagine we will push
more aggressively for democracy among
other allies that are even more central to
energy and security issues. The notion
that Georgia, because it is the strongest
democracy in the Caucasus, should not be
subject to criticism, but should be lauded
for its accomplishments, also has a fair
amount of support in Washington. How-
ever, this is a "tallest building in Topeka"
argument. Nobody in Georgia, including
the government, is satisfied with simply
looking better than Armenia or Azerbai-
jan with regard to democracy.
Moving from supporting democracy
to accepting semidemocracy would be a
significant shift in our post-cold-war pol-
icy. Changing from a real commitment to
trying to help countries achieve genuine
freedom and democracy, and settling for
tall Topekan buildings, would be walking
away from a policy which has contributed
to the expansion of democracy to places
ranging from Eastern Europe to South
America and southern Africa. Our support
for these nascent democracies has contrib-
uted to improving the lives of millions and
winning friends and allies for the United
States.
In contrast, when there is a gap be-
tween U.S. rhetoric on democracy and ac-
tual policy, support for the United States
wanes. This is the case even in Georgia. At
one time, pro-American feeling was nearly
universal in Georgia. This has begun to
somewhat change-as manifested by pro-
tests in front of the U.S. Embassy and in-
creasing charges levied by the opposition
that the United States has chosen to sup-
port Saakashvili rather than democracy.
And if "semidemocracy" is the best
the United States is prepared to offer,
perhaps, in other countries now "in the
middle" between authoritarianism and
"full democracy," the Chinese or Russian
state-corporatist models might begin to
seem more appealing.
The Rose Revolution was at one time
a source of hope that we might be see-
ing the beginning of a new wave of de-
mocratization. Less than five years later,
those hopes seem somewhat quaint. The
question we now face in Georgia and else-
where, whether we choose to admit it or
not, is whether or not the efforts of the
last quarter century to help spread democ-
racy to previously unimaginable corners of
the world have finally run their course. oD
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